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This paper attempts to bring together some of the basic facts about and 
major issues raised by the petroleum c r is is . It  concentrates on estimating 
the possible orders of magnitude of these problems on the basis of the 
assumption that the price of crude w ill stay constant at the January 197^ 
levels (taking the Persian Gulf prices as the point of reference). This paner 
is  divided into four sections: ( l )  the historical background* (2) the macro- 
economic situation., (3) the effects on the agricultural sector and (It) the 
competitive position of agricultural raw materials vis à vis synthetics.
Thjs background to the cr i s i s
World consumption of petroleum has risen at 6 percent per annum since 1929, 
slower at f ir s t  and gradually accelerating -  7 percent in the f i f t ie s  and 
8 percent in the s ix tie s . Moreover, the world has become more dependent on 
petroleum for its  energy requirements: In 1929» 15 percent of world energy
requirements derived from petroleum. This rose to 25 percent in 1950. 31 percent 
in i 960* and k2 percent in 1970 1 / .
Nearly three quarters of world consumption is  accounted for by the developed 
countries and their main sources of imports in 1972 were the Middle East 62 percent, 
North Africa 13 percent . Nigeria 7 percent-, Venequela 5 percent , and Far Eastern 
countries h percent. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 20 percent and Iran for 
l6  percent of crude o il  imports.
The consumption of petroleum by end use in 1970 for Western Europe was 
Î+0 fuel o i l ,  W  for transport*, and 12 percent other uses; for North America the
figures were l8 ,  60 and 22 percent: and for Japan the shares were 32, 57 and 11
percent respectively.
Prices had been remarkably stable over the f i f t ie s  and s ix tie s . For example 
Saudi Arabian (ex Ras Tanura 3*t.0°.) posted price was 1.75 US dollars a barrel 
in I 95O and I .80 dollars in 1970. The United Kingdom import price c . i . f .
(Kuwait crude 31 .0 °) was 2.77 US dollars a barrel in 1950 and 2.51 dollars in 19T0. 
In real terms, therefore, the import price had fallen steadily over the la st two 
decades. Nevertheless, due to the increased volume of world trade, the revenues 
to o il exporting countries 2 / rose from an estimated 0.5 b illio n  US dollars in 
1950 to 2 .3  b illio n  US dollars in i 960, 7 .6  b illio n  US dollars in 1970, and
12.9 b illio n  US dollars in 1972. The net import cost of developed countries in 1970
were 15 b illio n  US dollars whereas in 1972 they amounted to about 23 b illio n
US dollars.
1 /  See UN, S ta tistica l Papers, Series J r,World Energy Supplies". 
2 / OPEC members only.
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The sequence of events which led the present c r isis  can be traced back to  
the end of 1970 when producing countries started to raise posted prices.
Between 1970 and 1 October 1973 the posted prices of the most representative
grades of crude had risen by between 60 and over 100 percent. After the
outbreak of h o stilitie s  in the Middle East some major producers declared their
intention of progressively cutting back supplies to the world market and
certain countries were to receive no crude from these sources. Secondly,
most important producers raised their posted prices by at least 70 percent on
iC  October 1973. Indonesia and Venezuela followed on 1 November 1973. At
the end of December a further massive increase in posted prices w&3 announced,
in effect more than doubling the posted prices. As a result posted prices *
now are over four times the Aoril 1973 level and about six and one half times
the 1970 level.
Table 1 gives an estimate of the impact on import prices of the sequence 
of events over the last four years. The figures for 197** have been estimated 
from a range of sources and are, therefore, illu strative  only, but the order 
o f magnitude is  rrobably representative of the market. ’ I t  should be borne in 
mind that petroleum prices vary considerably: for example, Libyan,Nigerian and
Venezuelan crude se lls  at a considerable premium due to a mixture of quality 
factors and nearness to markets (particularly with the Suez Canal closed) and 
these three countries enjoy nearly a dollar a barrel freight advantage in 
their main markets over the Gulf producers. However, percentage increases are 
lik e ly  to have been much the same. Some of the more alarming orice quotations 
at the start of 197** referred to spot sales which were eagerly taken up due 
to the supply restriction on the part of Arab producers and are not thought to 
be representative of 197** prices as a whole.
For the purpose of tracing the effects of petroleum price increases, i t  
is assumed throughout that c . i . f .  Rotterdam is the basic price and that this 
has increased 2 .3  times between 1973 (taken to be April) and 197**.
The macro economic situation and outlook
Prior to the o i l  crisis  the world economy, especially the economies of the 
OECD member countries, was growing rapidly. The business upswing had begun 
in the early months of 1972 gathered momentum in the second half of the year, 
and continued to accelerate during 1973. This business cycle gave rise to the 
strongest boom in economic activity witnessed in the OECD area as a whole since 
the early 1 9 5 0 s . The strength of the boom was mainly attributable to :
( i)  the existence of larger than usual margins of space capacity and levels of 
employment in the OECD area as a whole, ( i i )  very expansionary economic 
policies followed during 1972 and 1973, and ( i i i )  the simultaneity of economic 
expansion in a ll  major countries, especially in the United States, Japan and 
Germany, which became very widespread through international transmission.
The vigour of the boom can be seen from the following figures of GNP 
growth for the major developed countries together with forecasts prepared by 
the OECD before the o i l  c r is is .
Table 1: Structure o f  Prices of- Crude O il^  in U.S. Dollars per Barrel
1970 I 97I 1972 1973
Estimated
1971* % increase to 197!+ from




1. Posted price 1.800 2. I 8O 2.1*79 2.591 2.73 11.651 51*7 370 327
2. Production cost 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.13 0.130
3. Royalty 0.225 0.273 0.310 O.32I* 0.31* 1.1*56
1*. Tax 0.673 O.978 1.121 1.175 I . 2I* 5.535
5- Total Government Revenue (3+1*) 0.989 1.251 - 1.1*31 1.1*99 1.58 6.991 679 389 31*2
6. Tax Paid Cost (5+2) 1.028 1.381 I .561 1.629 I . 7I 7.121̂
7- Estimated cost of participation - - - 0.101+ 0.11 0. 11,
8. Oil Company Margin 0.222 0.279 0.279 0.327 0.1*3 0.1+3
9- Selling price f .o .b . 1.25 1.66 1.81* 2.06 2.25 7.66
10. Freight Ras Tanura/Rotterdam O.9O I .06 0.92 0.95 0;98 1.37
11. C .i . f .  Rotterdam 2.15 2.72 2.76 3.01 3.23 9.03 320 227 I 80
Source : ”Chemical Feedstock Supply in the Light of the World Oil Position” by W.L. Newton in Chemistry and
Industry, No,13, July 1973, p.607-609.
Notes :
a/  3^°API Arabian ligh t at Pas Tanura.
b / This has been estimated at 7-108 dollars by Petroleum. Weekly Intelligence V ol.XII, No.53, December 31, 1973,p .3
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Canada M 5.8 5.3 7.25 9.fc ^.75 6 .0
U.S.A. 3.9 2 .7 6.1 6.00 6,9 3 .0 2 .0
Japan 11.1 6 .h 9-6 11.00 11.6 7.0 7.0
France 5.8 5.5 5.5 6.25 6.5 6.0 5-5
Germany, F.R. 1;.9 2.7 3.0 6.25 11.2 1.5 3.5
Italy 5.5 1.6 3.5 5.25 3 .0 10.0 6.5
U.K. 2 .9 1 .7 3 .0 6.75 8.U 3.0 3.25
TOTAL h.B 3.3 5-8 6.75 8 .0 U.O 3.5
Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
As a result of the exceptionally strong boom in industrial a ctiv ity , demand 
pressures were building up in virtually  a l l  the countries thus accentuating the 
price inflation which had already become more serious due to widespread supply 
d ifficu ltie s  in many commodity markets.
Wholesale prices rose even more dramatically in 1973 up 2.9 percent in 
Japan and 18 percent in the United States to give but two ex,amples. Interest
rates also rose to exceptionally high lev els . In most countries, anti- 
inflationary policies were generally confined to monetary measures which sought 
to restrict the exnansion of money supply through credit restrictions. But the 
time lag in the effects of these policies tended to he longer, and their 
efficiency in curtailing demand appeared to be much less than in earlier  
comparable periods. On the contrary, fisc a l policies in overall terms were 
s t i l l  broadly geared either to stimulate the economy or to permit above­
capacity growth rates to continue, either because unemployment had reached very 
high rates in the economic slowdown of 1970-713 or because fisc a l policies had 
tended to become less flexib le  for the management of demand, and the effectiveness 
of monetary policies for domestic demand management was constrained by the 
uncertainty of currency exchange rates, -
The overall p r e c r is is  outlook could thus he characterized as a slowdown 
in real economic growth coupled with continuing in flation . Developments in the 
petroleum sector have changed this outlook for the worse. F irst, the physical 
limitations on supplies of o i l  and disruption to production in user industries 
at the end of 1973 and in early 197^ cut into energy supplies and hence 
industrial production, and secondly, the higher costs of imported o il have 
augmented inflationary tendencies. However, whilst the costs of o il  w ill force 
the majority of o il  importing countries to restrict consumption as far as possible 
for balance of payments reasons, the macro-economic impact of the energy crisis  
country by country is d iffic u lt  to assess due to uncertainties as to the range 
of possible reactions on the part of importing countries.
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For example, although the industrialized countries depend for about 50 
percent of their tota l energy requirements on petroleum, the position varies 
widely from country to country. The dependence on imported o il  also-varies  
greatly with 68 percent of Japan's energy requirements being set by imported 
o il and at the other extreme the United States relying on imported petroleum 
for 12 percent of its  energy use. Moreover, the overall balance of payments 
situation for individual countries w ill d iffer according to the way in which 
surplus revenues of o il  exporting countries are re-cycled. At the seme time, 
governments in industrialized countries are studying means of cutting 
consumption in view of the high prices that they have to pay for petroleum, 
and it  may be assumed the balance of payments and inflationary problems that 
are going to arise in most developed countries may lead some governments into 
deflationary policies which, through the multiplier e ffe c t , could further erode 
the growth of industrial production. On balance, therefore, predictions made 
in the early months of 197** pointed to very slow economic growth in the main 
industrial countries 1 / ,  but greater than usual degrees of uncertainty attach 
to such calculations.
To estimate the impact of petroleum price rises on the general price le v e l, 
the simplest approach is  to multiply the share of the petroleum input in the 
tota l cost of production by the increase in petroleum prices. The share of 
petroleum consumption in GNP for the major industrialized countries is  between 
1 and 2 percent (see Table 3 ). Therefore, the direct impact is lik e ly  to add 
between 2 and 1* percent to the ongoing general rate of inflation in industrialized  
countries. This calculation ignores the effect on inflation  of the cut in 
industrial output occasioned by the reduction in supply of o il  and the 
repercussions of possible policy changes as a result o f the severe strain on 
the balance of payments which most industrialized countries w ill experience.
Table 3: Share of Petroleum Consumption in GDP in Selected Developed Countries
Country
Oil Consumption 
m illion million  
m .t. U.S.$
1972 GDP 
b illio n  
U.S.$
Percentage value Oil 
Consumption over GDP
Belgium 2 k . 6 615 35.6 1 .7
France 99.3 2 1*82 I 96.I 1 .3
Germany, F.R. 128.0 3 200 257.6 1 .2
Italy 87.2 2 I 80 117.6 1 .9
Netherlands 2U.8 620 1*6.3 1 .3
Spain 29.it 735 1*7.5* 1 .5
Sweden 27.2 680 1*5-7* 1 .5
U.K. 97-7 2 1*1*2 151*. 2 1 .6
U.S.A. 761.5 19 038 1178.0 1 .6
Canada 8O.2 2 005 IO6.O 1 .9
Japan 202.6 5 O65 29l*.3 1 .7
* estimate
Source OECD Oil S tatistics 1972, Table 11.
Price assumed $25 a ton finished products.
1 / E.g. the Chase Manhattan Bank in International Finance, December 3 , 1973, 
pp 1 -3 , estimated the growth of the U.S. economy at zero or very slow for 
197^*) growth in Canada to decline from 5 to 3 percent; Japan to have zero 
growth or even a decline; and the Federal Republic of Germany to experience 
a 2 percent growth.
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Considering that the la st two years (1972-73) have witnessed sharp 
increases in GNP, which was á major contributing factor to the boom in commodity 
markets, the stagnation at the beginning of 197^ w ill trim the growth in demand 
for agricultural products. The amount w ill depend on the demand e la stic itie s  
for the individual products.
At the same time, part o f the massive increase in prices of most commodities 
during 1972-73 has been attributed to a movement of liquid funds into commodities 
as a hedge against in flation , and to pressure of commercial demand for stocks to 
sustain accelerating industrial activ ity . The new prospects, o f relative  
stagnation in business a ctiv ity , of high interest rates and of possible 
deflationary p o lic ies , may further curtail demand for many commodities. But,
other factors may be expected to counteract these tendencies. F irstly , 
increases in money incomes w ill to some extent moderate any decreases in prices 
of agricultural commodities expressed in current terms. Secondly, the 
substantial increases in costs of agricultural production, due inter a lia  to the 
fe r tiliz e r  and fuel situation, combined with recent decreases in commodity 
prices -  which in many instances peaked in late 1973 or early 197^ -  could have 
dampening effects on the rate of expansion of future production. Moreover,
special factors apply in the case of agricultural raw materials, particularly  
fibres and natural rubber, which compete with synthetic materials produced by 
the petro-chemical sector.
Concerning costs o f agricultural production, the main impact of the energy 
crisis  arises from the transmission of price increases of crude petroleum 
through feedstock prices to fe r t i liz e r , pesticide and other input prices. In 
this connection, basic feedstock prices in the short run have not risen directly  
in proportion to the rise in petroleum costs since pricing structures also 
reflect the varying demand situations of user industries. In the sligh tly  longer 
run, however, i t  is  not unreasonable to expect feedstock costs to rise in much 
the same proportion as crude petroleum prices.
For fe r t i liz e r s , the share in tota l costs of feedstocks is  hard to estimate. 
Based on cost structures for Western Europe published by OECD in 1968 1 / ,  naptha 
and fuel o i l  accounted for about 13 percent of the unsubsidized farmgate price, 
and 17 percent of the ex-facrtory price, o f nitrogen fe r t iliz e r . The factory 
to farmgate transport and distribution cost comprised about 20 percent of 
farmgate price. By 1973 petroleum prices had risen by 50 percent above the 
levels prevalent in the m id-sixties and i t  i s ,  therefore, lik e ly  that these 
cost elements had increased in importance before the la test series of o il  price 
increases. On reasonable assumptions, the increases in petroleum prices since 
mid- 1973 could have a long-run effect of pushing up farm-gate nitrogen fe r t iliz e r  
prices by some Uo to 50 percent. However, a very tight supply situation  
already existed due to insufficient capacity at a time when demand for fe rtiliz e rs  
had been stimulated by exceptionally large price increases of most agricultural 
commodities. As a consequence, current price increases over-shadow this  
underlying increase in costs. At the seme time, the three-fold increase in 
phosphate rock prices, announced by Morocco in December 1973, and increased 
demand for potash fe r t iliz e r  mean that price increases for a ll fe rtiliz e rs  w ill 
remain much above the levels of mid-1973 even after new plants, currently on 
order or under construction, come on stream. The incidence of these cost 
increases on individual products w ill vary according to the pattern of input use. 
Thus, fe r t iliz e r  intensive crops such as wheat, maize, rice, sugar and cotton 
w ill be relatively more affected than legumes such as soybeans and groundnuts 
which are less dependent on chemical fe r t iliz e r s .
I f  OECD: Supply and demand prospects for fe rtiliz e rs  in developing countries,
Paris 1968.
The possib le  e ffe c ts  on agriculture
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Sim ilarly, shortages aid high prices o f feedstocks have given rise to a 
serious supply/demand situation for pesticides although, again, the petroleum 
crisis  is  only one of the contributory factors. Whilst tota l demand for 
pesticides in 1973/7lj is  estimated, on the basis of firm orders, to have 
risen by about 25 percent, production has shown a slight decline. Consequently, 
current demand is  being met by drawing on production which would normally have 
been available for the 197^/75 season. The most critica l current shortages 
relate to herbicides for use on wheat and other cereal crops, but major 
insecticides and fungicides are also in short supply. Crop protection 
typically comprises a relatively large component in the tota l production costs 
of such crops as cotton, maize and bananas: but the impact of increased
pesticide costs is especially pronounced for bananas, a commodity which has 
not shared in the widespread price boom of 1972-1973.
Transport costs depend significantly on fuel prices, but to calculate the 
effect on transport costs, i t  is  necessary to look at government policy in this  
sector. In most countries, governments tax petrol and fuel o il  so that the 
effect on prices can be greatly reduced by government decisions on the tax 
lev e l. But two other aspects o f national policies enter into the equation. 
F irst, the tax yields are extremely important to government finances in most 
countries and secondly, transport is  one of the main sectors where fuel 
economies are practised to conserve energy or to protect the balance of payments. 
Balancing these considerations i t  might be envisaged that fuel prices to the 
transport sector w ill reflect a substantial proportion of the increase in 
petroleum prices, as has already been witnessed in several countries. Moreover, 
i t  would be d iffic u lt  to insulate the agricultural and food sectors of the 
economy from this burden. Although fuel costs also play an important role in 
determining the trend of international shipping costs , year to year variations 
in freight rates depend very much on the supply and demand situation in the 
freight market. Between the f ir s t  quarter of 1972 and the third quarter of 
1973, world scale rates rose from about 50 to about 300 having fallen  from 
about 170 in the f ir s t  quarter of 1971.
The resulting increases in farming costs and effects on agricultural 
production depend upon the proportion of tota l costs accounted for by 
fe r t iliz e r s , pesticides, fuel and transport, the response of output to 
fe r tiliz e r  (and fuels) and the response of product price to reductions in 
output. Here we are concerned with purely synthetic indicators of the overall 
effects within the agricultural sector, and stress that the effects on individual 
commodities -  themselves interrelated -  may be very diverse.
For developed countries, the structure of farm costs in the late 1960s 
is  given in Table it. F ertilizer and fuel costs together account for about 
10 percent of the value of tota l production and, taking the shares of 
fe rtiliz e rs  and fuel each as 5 percent, the r ise  in production costs as a 
consequence of the o il  price increases from mid-1973 is estimated at about 
10 percent. To assess the broad impact on the agricultural sector, the 
e la stic ity  of farm output to fe r t iliz e r  input is  assumed to be 0 .0 5 , 1 /  the 
price e la stic ity  of demand for farm products is  assumed to be -0 .2  and the 
price increase for fe r tiliz e rs  is  taken as 50 percent. Under these conditions, 
i t  is  estimated that production ceteris paribus would be 2 percent lower, and 
the general level of farm prices some 10 percent higher. This excludes the 
repercussions of possible increases in fuel costs and does not, of course, take 
into account other demand and supply factors. While demand increases w ill
1 / For U.S. agriculture, the e la stic ity  of output with respect to input prices 
has been estimated at -O.O6 which is  extremely close to the (im plicit) 
e la stic ity  of -0 .053  used here. See ’’Searching the Seventies" F ertilizer  
Production and Marketing Conference 1971, p .26.
Table U: Shares o f  Petroleum Based Inputs in Value o f  A gricultural Production -  ■ Selected Countrie












National Currencies ,.% of Value of Production ..
Belgium (l97l)P 5897 0385 ï IO282 I+5527 50662 96189 6,1 1+.6 10,7
Denmark (1968) 603 222 825 3358 6719 IOO77 6.0 2.2 8.2
Finland (I968) 333.0 9I+.2 1+27,2 831.2 2682,1 3513.3 9.5 2,7 12,2
France (1971)P 5169 2215 7381+ 25327 50151 75I+78 6,8 2.9 9.7
Germany F.R. (l97l)P 2638 227*+ 1+912 I802I 2177I+ 39795 6.6 5,7 12.3
Italy (I97I)P 178982 67853 2I+6835 1650585 52I+9503 690OO88 2,6 1,0 3.6
Luxembourg (1971)P 190 83 273 1375 1939 331I+ 5.7 2,5 8.2
Netherlands (l97l)P U70 180 650 5920 6350 1227O 3,8 1 .5 5.3
Norway (I968) 205, k 176.6 382.O 2061.2 2727.I 1+788.3 1+.3 3.7 8,0
Portugal (1968) 123 - 123 558O 20097 25677 0,5 - -
Sweden (1968) I+6O.O 209,0 669.O 27I+7.7 3367.1+ 6115.1 7.5 3 .1+ 10.9
Switzerland (1968) 127.7 105.1+ 233,1 11+09.9 2507,3 3917.2 3.3 2.7 6.0
U.K. (1968) 150 77 227 II61 IOI6 1177 12.7 6.5 19.2
U.S.A. (1968) 2125 1796 3921 19I+62 261+28 I+589O 1+.6 3.9 8.5
p = p r o v is io n a l .
S ou rce : PEC A ~ r icu ltu ra l S t a t i s t i c s  •* 1972  ̂ No. U.
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probably be lim ited due to depressed growth in real incomes, population growth 
w ill give some boost to demand. Supply has been stimulated by the 1972-73 
commodity price boom and, given the precarious existing supply/demand 
situation for basic food commodities, these price incentives should be 
sufficient to o ffset the negative effects o f fe r t iliz e r  and fuel cost increases 
on production.
For developing countries, the situation is  more serious. Although 
fe r t iliz e r  and fuel costs account for a comparatively small fraction of the 
value of agricultural production (Table 5 ) , almost one-half of their total 
consumption of nitrogen is  imported, almost entirely from developed countries. 
Given the shortage of fe r t i liz e r s , and pesticides, elsewhere in the world, part 
of the increased needs of many developing countries is  lik e ly  to go unsatisfied  
at the very high current price le v e ls . However, estimates of the size of
this "fe r t iliz e r  gap" in the short-run d iffer according to the assumptions 
.which are made about desired requirements.
One such estimate 1 / is  that fe r t iliz e r  consumption in India w ill fa l l  by 
1 million tons (29 percent) in 197*+ with a consequent drop in output o f grains 
o f 10 million tons (10 percent), indicating an ou tp u t-to -fertilizer e la stic ity  
of about 0 .3 5 . This may be an appropriate e la stic ity  for high-yielding  
varieties but the average figure for India would be much lower. To derive 
rea listic  e la stic itie s  would involve detailed country studies, but some idea of  
the magnitudes involved can be arrived at by comparing the historical increase 
in cereal yields with fe r t iliz e r  consumption. Over the period 1901-1972, 
cereal yields in the developing countries as a group rose by 20 percent whereas 
their consumption of nitrogen fe r t iliz e r  in 1972 was 3 .5  times that in 1961: 
on admittedly oversimplified assumptions, this would imply an output-to- 
fe r tiliz e r  e la stic ity  of 0.ll+. Even i f  i t  is assumed that fe r t iliz e r  usage 
in the coming year fa lls  short of requirements by a less  dramatic amount than 
is supposed by Professor Ewell (by, say, 10 to 20 percent) and using this  
lower e la stic ity , cereal yields in developing countries would be 1.1+ to
2.8  percent less  than otherwise. By comparison, cereal production in the 
developing countries had been increasing by 3.1  percent per year during 1961 to 
1971, just keeping ahead of population growth.
In the longer run, even i f  supplies o f fe r tiliz e rs  and pesticides become 
more readily available, their prices, together with those of fu e l, w ill be 
considerably higher than before mid-1973. The impact, however, would depend 
partly on movements in the prices of agricultural commodities, both at the farm 
level and in international markets, on progress which can be made to accelerate 
the production of agricultural inputs -  especially fe rtiliz e rs  -  in developing 
countries, and on the priorities attaching to the allocation o f foreign exchange 
earnings. In this la tter  connection, the problem of finding the foreign 
exchange for urgently needed fe r tiliz e rs  has been made vastly more d iffic u lt by 
the rise in import prices of petroleum and basic foodstuffs, including freight 
rates. For example, i t  has been estimated that the cost to developing countries 
of commercial imports o f cereals rose from $1+000 millions in 1972/73 to around 
$9000-10000 m illions in 1973/71+, whilst thë additional cost of o il  imports in 
1971+ might be in the neighbourhood of $8000 millions compared with 1973, and 
that their current account d efic it could be double the 1973 level o f $10000 
m illions. This is notwithstanding the benefits which many developing countries 
have derived from higher prices for many of their main export commodities.
1 / 'Energy and Food' by Anthony Lewis, reporting the findings of
Professor R. Ewell in International Herald Tribune, 8 January 1971+.
Table 5 ; Shares of Petroleum Based Inputs in Value of A gricultural Production -  Selected Countries












National Currencies o f  Value of Production . .
Ceylon (1970) 203 1 / 122 324 585 3660 4246 4.8 2 .9 7 .7
Costa Rica (I969) 96 23 120 437 1099 1537 6.3 1.5 7 .8
Cyprus (1969) 2082 913 2995 13509 37685 2 / 51194 4 .1 1 .8 5.9
Egypt (1968) 35 15 50 284 694 2 / 978 3 .6 1 .5 5.1
Guatemala (1961*) 5 4 9 34 348 2 / 382 1.3 1 .1 2.4
India (1967) 1847 651 2498 30161 117843 2 [ 148004 1.2 0.4 1 .6
Indonesia (I968) 13561 - I356I  3 / 87835 930560 2 / 1018395 1.3 - -
Jordan (1969) 0 ,3 0 .2 0*5 5 37 2 / 42 0.7 0.6 1 .3
Korea, Rep. (1970) 51020 - 51020 3 / 170346 622374 793720 6.4 - ■ -
Libya ( I969) 865 1263 2128 8362 36248 44610 1.9 2 .8 4 .7
Mexico (1967) 1188 880 2068 5939 32362 38301 3.1 2 .3 5.4
Morocco (I970) (28) (16) (44) 551 3586 2 / 4137 0.7 0.4 1 .1
Philippines (I965) 136 0.5 137 912 4327 2 / 5239 2.6 - 2 .6
Uruguay (I969) 2699 1707 44o6 20994 52571 2 / 73565 3.7 2.3 6 .0
1 / Including pesticides»
2 / GDP at market prices,
3 / Fertilizers only.
Source; FAO Economic Accounts for Agriculture (Production Account) 1961-1970,
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Markets formerly dominated by agricultural raw materials, including 
rubber, fib res, hides and skins, have since the second world war been faced 
with intensive competition from synthetic substitutes developed by the rapidly 
expanding petroleum industries of high-income countries. For example, 
synthetics currently account for almost 30 percent of the world's supply of 
apparel fibres, two thirds of the world elastomer market, and have 
substantially displaced ju te , hard fibres and natural leather in many end-uses.
It is  estimated that in late 1972 naptha represented some 55-60 percent 
of the to ta l cost of making most o f the base chemicals used as feedstocks for 
the production of synthetic fibres and rubber. A further 15-20 percent could 
be attributed to the costs of energy used in extracting the base chemicals.
With these assumptions, i t  is  estimated that the cost of the main base chemicals 
is  now some two to three times the level of late 1972, and rather more than 
three times that level in the case of butadiene and isoprene.
For synthetic fibres, however, base chemicals accounted for only 10-15 
percent of the final cost o f the fibres in 1972, the exact proportion varying 
according to the type of fibre and the complexity of its  manufacturing processes 
Direct energy costs accounted for a further 15 percent of production costs in 
the case of polyester fibres and up to 30 percent in the case of acrylics. 
Consequently the impact of the energy crisis  on costs of producing synthetic 
fibres is  lik ely  to be moderate compared to it s  effect on the base chemicals 
from which they are made. Thus, as is shown in Table 6 , the competitive 
position of cotton in the short run seems to have improved only slig h tly  vis à 
vis polyester due to the large increase in prices of cotton fibre . Conversely, 
wool appears to have become much more competitive, although i t  should be borne 
in mind that its  prices in late 1972 were considerably higher than those of its  
synthetic substitutes.
The possib le  e ffe c ts  on agricu ltural raw materials 1 /






\ j U.S. cents per kg.
8 5 - 9 5  . l 60 -  170
ll+O -  150 i 260 -  290
1 : 1 .6  i 1 : 1 .6  -  1 .7
Wool j 360 -  1*30 j U80 -  600
I Acrylic fibre ' I 70 -  190 I 290 -  300
I Ratio i 2 .1  -  2 .3  : 1 ! 1 .6  -  2 .0  : 1
In comparison with fib res, the production of synthetic rubber involves a 
smaller number of processing operations. Hence, the direct impact of the 
energy crisis  on the cost of producing synthetic rubber Í3 lik ely  to be 
considerably greater. In the short run, however, the extent of price increases 
w ill probably be moderated by the general dampening of demand for elastomers, 
especially due to the effects of the energy crisis  on the tyre sector, and by 
relatively abundant supplies o f natural rubber. In the longer run i t  is  
estimated that there is  lik ely  to be a two to three fold rise in the cost of 
production of synthetic rubber which can be directly attributed to the energy 
c r is is , whilst increases in the cost of producing natural rubber w ill be 
considerably smaller despite rises in prices of fe rtiliz e rs  and chemical yield  
stimulants.____________________________________
1 / For a more detailed analysis see FAO Commodity Review and Outlook, 1973-197^ 
Chapter 2 , Rome 197^ (forthcoming).
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In summary, and with reference to Latin America, the implications vary 
widely from country to country within the Region. F irstly , the impact of  
the energy crisis  at the country level -  as far as balance o f payments 
prospects are concerned -• depends in a large measure on the broad pattern 
of merchandise imports and exports. At one extreme Venezuela is  a 
substantial exporter of petroleum but at the same time a sizeable net 
importer of food and other agricultural products. "At the other extreme most 
of the countries in Central America are dependent upon imports for the hulk 
of their energy requirements and upon their agricultural sectors for a high 
proportion of their foreign exchange earnings. Within the agricultural 
sector, as w ell, the impact on individual countries w ill vary according to 
the commodity composition of their agricultural production and trade and 
their dependence on imports o f agricultural requisites, especially  
fe rtilizers  and pesticides (see Table j ) .
For the main agricultural commodities traded by countries of the Region, 
the implications of the energy crisis  are of three types. F irstly , as has 
been implied in the discussion earlier, market prospects in the industrial, 
importing countries w ill be adversely affected by the expectation of a 
slow-down in economic growth at least in the short-term. This problem may 
be particularly acute for those commodities with relatively high e la stic itie s  
of demand, such as meats. Secondly, as has been indicated, the impact on 
production costs would be mere severe in the case of those commodities which 
are comparatively heavily dependent upon energy-based inputs, including maize, 
bananas, cotton and sugar. But, fin a lly , where the energy crisis  also 
affects commodities, such as synthetic fibres, which compete with those of 
agricultural origin, the la tter  would tend to gain a competitive edge, 
although this would not be very substantial.
Table 7 Net exports of main agricultural commodities of selected- Latin. American Countries
(1969 71 A verages , m ill io n U .S. d o l la r s)
CoBinr d it y  ' Meat C ereals Bananas C offee Su=~ar F ibres T ota l A g r ie ,
r ■—1 * - ............ - ---
F e r t i l i z e r s
S t , T , C. (01) (ok) (051,3) (07I .I ) (06) (Ex26) P roducts and ‘
'1 (net import s + n et im ports (n e t )
P e s t ic id e s  
(271 56 599,2)|i
Costo. R ica 17.3 - 9,3 60,8 62.7 10,3 0,1 131.6
-----  ---- --
- 10.2 ;
:Dominican R epublic 3-1 o . o 0.5 23,1 115-1 * ■ « -4 lk7.5 k.2
El Salvador -  0.7 -  k .l « H « t 96,0 7.3 23,1 110.5 -15,1
Guatemala 15.2 - 6.3 12.7 92.8 11.3 30.2 I 61.O -  9.8
Honduras Q 0 - 5.8 80.k 2.2,5 0,9 1.7 107.8 -  6.k
Mexico ho. 2 k.2 o .l 71,7 105 = 5 87.5 380.0 -10 2
Nicaragua 25.0 - . O.k 0,8 27.3 9-k kl.2 111.5 ~ 5.6
Panama - 2.1 - 7.3 61.8 1.2 5 = 2 kl.5 -  5.7
A rgentina k32.7 kÇ3,2 -  9 ,5 -  32,7 15.6 81.0 1317,3 -11.2
B r a z il Ilk 2 - fk.6 10,3 8kl,6 139.1 20k, 9 1580.6 - 91.8
C hile -  Ik .2 - k8.2 - 7 = 5 -  8,k ■ 10.8 .'.21.6 -  160.9 *23, k
Colombia 6.6 -  23.9 17 .k k02.5 16.2 20.8 k50.5 -  k.k
Ecuador f « o a -  8.1 101.5 37.9 11.6 0.9 160.3 - 6.k
"Deru - 11. k - 57.1 36.8 58.7 58.0 30.1 -  9.3
Venezuela
-
-  2.8 -  66 .6 1.3 13.9 k.6 -  5.1
.
-  1 6 6 . 6 - 9.3
Source FAO Trade Yearbook, 1972.

